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THE THEORY OF IIOUSEIIOLI) BEHAVIOR:
SOME FOUNDATIONS
wt' K1LVIN LANCASTER*
This paper is concerned with examining the common practice of considering the household to act us if it
were a single individuaL Iconcludes rhut aggregate household behavior wifl diverge front the behavior
of the typical individual in Iwo important respects, but that the degree of this divergence depend: on
well-defined variables--the number of goods and characteristics in the consu;npf ion fecIJflolOgv relative
to the size of the household, and thextent of joint consumption within the houseiwid. For appropriate
values of these, the degree of divergence may be very small or zero.
For some years now, it has been common to refer to the basic decision-making
entity with respect to consumption as the "household" by those primarily con-
cerned with data collection and analysis and those working mainly with macro-
economic models, and as the "individua1' by those working in microeconomic
theory and welfare economics. Although one-person households do exist, they
are the exception rather than the rule, and the individual and the household cannot
be taken to be identical.
In the total absence of trade between the micro-welfare and macro-empirical
branches of the profession, it might not matter that the consumption units were
different in the different contexts. But there is tradeperhaps less than there ought
to be and this is where the danger lies, It is not uncommon to take analysis that
has been devised to provide a reasonable model of the single individual and then
apply that analysis to the household, as if it were the same thing. The most sur-
prising offender is Arrow and Hahn (1971) where, in a book designed to meet the
highest standards of analytical rigor, the basic decision-maker in consumption is
called the "household"and then has ascribed to it a set of properties that are
appropriate only for the single individual.
If it could be shown that households did, indeed, behave like the individuals
of microtheory, then there would be no problem, but we know that this can be
taken to be evidently true, if at all, only in a household run in a dictatorial fashion
by a single decision-maker. If the household does behave like an individual in any
other circumstances, we must be able to prove this and be able clearly to state those
circumstances.
The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on the fact that the typical house-
hold consists of more than one person and to investigate the extent to which it is
(a) entirely or (b) approximately legitimate to ascribe to that housohold those
properties traditionally ascribed to the single consumer.
I. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE HOUSEHOLD
Since a household is composed of individuals, we must either construct a
theory of the household which is based on and derived from the theory of behavior
*This is a revised version of the paper delivered at the conference, reworked to strengthen the
substantive results and stripped of some interesting but unessential material.
5of individuals, suitably modified to take account of their association within the
household, or ignore those individuals altogether and construct a theory of the
household which issul generisand not based on individuals. The theory of the
consumption function is of this latter kind, not derivable from standard micro-
theory, as aread hocmodels such as the stock adjustment model of Houthakker
and Taylor (1970).
We shall be entirely concerned here with models of the first kind, basedon the
theory of individual behavior and using the results of niicrotheory. Remarkably
little has been done in this area, although Samuelson (1956) tackled theproblem
directly in what is probably the fullest discussion in the economics literatureof the
relation of household decisions to individual preferences.Becker (1965), Muth
(1966) and others since have considered the problemsassociated with production
(implicit and explicit) within the household and withtime allocation within the
household, but assumed awayany problems associated with the household's
decision function. There is, ofcourse, an extensive literature on both aggregation
and the construction of social welfare functions,two problems directly relevant to
the theory of the household, but with theemphasis placed on large, rather than
small, groups. The marketing literaturecontains much discussion of intra-
household decision processes, primarily fromthe point of view oftrying to influence
sales by manipulating these,' and there hasbeen considerable recent work in the
empirical investigation of who makes whatdecisions within the household.2
Finally there is decision theory, especiallythe work on teams by Marshak and
Radner (1972), which has relevanceto the household decision process. For the basic
problem with which weare concerned here, however, we cannot drawon any of
this literature except thaton aggregation and social welfare functions (including
the Samuelson article), sincewe shall confine ourselves to thepure demand proper-
ties of households under conditionsthat do not involve production,time or uncertainty.
The Individual
The individual, who willappear both as the typical member of thehousehold and as a reference with whosetypical behavior we shallcompare the behavior of the household, is thestandard individualconsumer of microtheory. He (she) is assumed to have complete andwell-ordered preferences, full information,and to optimize perfectly subject toa budget constraint withexogenous prices and income (or endowments). We shallconsider consumption behaviourin two contexts:
Traditional, in whichevery good fits into the preferencesystemin a way which is unique to itself, and
The characteristics model, inwhich goods possesscharacteristics which are typically obtainable also fromother goods or theircombinations,3
'For example, in consideringa household with some differences intastes (the wife likes opeca, the husband golf), a well-knowntext in this area goes on to conclude,"in this case it may be desirablefor a manufacturc of golf equipmentto attempt to convince the wifethat the husband's need forrecreation is, in fact, legitimate" (Engel,Kollat and Blackwelj,Consumer Behavior,Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1968. pp. 330-1.)
See, fee' example, Ferber and Nicosia(1973).
See Lancaster (1966) or (1971).
6In using the characteristics model,we shall confine ourselves to the case in
which the act of consumption ihat is, of extractingcharacteristics from goods) is
linearly combinable, in the sense that thecharacteristic. obtained from any
collection of goods is the sum of the characteristicscontained in the specified
quantities of the individual goods.
When investigating whether the householdcan he considered to behave like
a single individual, we shall concentrate on the following criteria whichare either
directly observable or can be derived from observable behavior:
The indiridual is efficient. In the traditionalcontext, this is either trivial
or unobservable (how could we know whether aconsumer was equating marginal
ratesofsubstitution to price ratios or not?), but is nontrivialand observable in the
characteristics model. In the latter model,a consumer who is efficient will, when
faced with choices among collections of Mgoods possessing between them only R
different characteristics (R < M), needto consume no more than R different
goods.
Substitur ion predominates in demand. This basicproperty, a consequence of
choice under a budget constraint with preferenceshaving the generally assumed
properties, can he expressed ina variety of different ways. The two "e shall be
particularly interested in are the alternatives:
The Slutsky matrix is symmetric and negativesemi-definite
The strong and weak axioms of revealedpreference are satisfied.
(The substantive contents of both (a) and (h)are equivalent.)
A household can be considered to actas f it was a single individual only if
the aggregate household consumptionvectors (obtained by summing the indivi-
dual consumption vectors over all membersofthe household), the aggregate
household income, and the price vector for goods,are related in such a way as to
satisfy (1) and (2) above.
The Household
The household is composed of individuals, but itis clearly more than that.
We shall consider the household topossess three leading properties
The household is a collection of individuals
It is a small collection of individuals
It is a closely-knit collection of individuals.
Insofar as the household is a collection of individuals,a theory of the house-
hold can draw on general theoretical resultsfor groups, such as aggregation
properties and the properties of social decision rules. Sinceit is a small collection,
we must reject group properties which dependon large numbers and search for
properties which depend on smallness of numbers. Sincethe household is a closely-
knit group, we can accept some thingslikeinterpersonal utility comparisons
that we would not over randomaggregates, and must be prepared to emphasize
others, like joint consumption, that wouldbe peripheral phenomena for large
groups.
We shall first investigate the extent to whichsmallness as such enables us to
reach different conclusions about the householdas an aggregate than we would
reach for a large group, then goon to investigate the effectofclose-knitness on the
household decision function andon joint consumption phenomena.
7II. HOUSEHOLDS AS SMALl. AG(;REUATEs
It is well known4 that, if individual consumptionvectors x chosen subject to
prices p andc'-mc arc aggregated into a group consumptionectoi
A'( x), thenA', Y ( =m'), p do not necessarily hear thesame k modof
relationship to each otheras to the equivalent quantities for the individuals. In
particular, the aggregate quantities neednot satisfy the weak axiomofrevealed
preference.
The best known example is the 2x 2 case given by Hicks (1956). where two
persons facing choices among two goods each choose collect ionsin two different
price-income situations whichare consistent with au standard assumptions about
individual behavior, but in which theaggcegate vectors have the properties
pX' < pX, p'X < p'X', contravening therevealed preference axiom.
Since the 2 x 2 example is particularlyclearcut, it was presumed formany
years that theaggregate properties ofsmallgroups were, ifanything, more divergent
from those of the individual thanthe aggregate properties of largegroups. The
Hicks example requires that theincome consumption curves of theindividuals be so related that the consumer choosing thelowest ratio of the first to the secondgood in the initial situation showsa much greater increase in the consumptionofthe first good, relative to thesecond, as income rises, than doesthe other consumer.
Thus it has been argued that thiskind of effect will wash outover a large group--an
argument which can be found spelledout in detail in Pearce(1964).
It is only recently that it hasbeen realized that it isnot the number of con- sumers. as such, that is relevant, butthe number ofconsumers relative to the number of goods. The failure ofthe aggregate demand in theI-licks case topossess any well-defined substitutionproperty is now seen to depend,not on the actual number of consumers, buton the fact that the numer of individualsis the same as the number of goods.
The Number of Goodsand the Size of the Group
The particular developmentsin theory that turnout to be especially relevant to the householdas a small group were set inmotion by Sonnenschejn(1972, 1973), who asked, andgave the first answer to, thefollowing question: Ifthe aggregate excess demand functionis continuous andsatisfies Wa!ras' L.aw (essentially an accountingidentity). but isotherwise arbitrary, couldthis excess demand function havebeen obtainedas the aggregation ofindividual excess demand functions each ofwhich possesses all theproperties derived fromtradi- tional preferencemaximizing behavior?Sonnenschein's affirmativeanswer was sharpened by Mantel (1974)and given definitiveshape by Debreu (1974)who Showed that the affirmativeanswer required that thenumber of individualsbe at least as greatas the number of goods.Further clarificationshave been made ina paper by McFadden, Mantel,Mas-Collel and Richter(1974?), and moppingup still continues
4See, for exampte,Samuejson (1948.
8If we invert the reasoning of the Sonnenschein-Mantel--Debreu result, it
implies that, in a world of N goods, there can exist N consumers with acceptable
individual behavior whose aggregate behavior does not necessarily exhibit the
traditional substitution properties. This explains the Hicks example. but shows
that it is a special case because it assumes only two goods, rather than because the
group comprises only two people.
Since a single individual exhibits all the standard demand behavior but an
aggregate of N individuals (assuming N goods) may show none, the interesting
question--and the crucial one for the theory of the householdis what happens
when there are at least two, but less than N, individuals? This question has been
answered by Diewert (1974'?) whose analysis we shall foUow.
Consider first an individual consumer. The Slutsky equations for this indivi-
dual can be written in the matrix form
V = K + bx'
where V is the matrix of uncompensated price partials, K is the Slutsky matrix,
b is the column vector of income partials and x the column vector of initially
chosen quantities. The demand properties of the individual are usually sum-
marized by noting that K is symmetric and negativesemi-definite. For our purposes
here,itis more useful to conider the properties of V. the uncompensated
matrix.
Let us choose a set of linearly independent vectors,4k, each of which is ortho-
gonal to x. There will ben - I such vectors, which we assemble into then x (n - I)
matrix A, where n is the number of goods. From the Slutsky equation we then
obtain
ATVA = ATK4 + ATbXTA
= AKA
since XTA0.
Now the properties of symmetry and negative semi-definiteness of K are
left unchanged by the transformationAT... .4, so that the matrix ATVA possesses
these properties. Thus, although the ii x n uncompensatedmatrix V is not itself
necessarily either symmetric or negative semi-definite, there alwaysexists a trans-
formation AT... A such that the (n - 1) x (n - 1) matrixATVA is symmetric
negative semi-definite.
If we think of the compensated demand function as exhibiting"full" concavity
properties (since we can associate with it a negative semi-definitematrix of order
n), the uncompensated demand function can be considered tohave one degree less
concavity, since the negative semi-definite property is associated with amatrix of
order n - I. Alternatively we can note that symmetry imposesn(n - I) re-
strictions on the compensated matrix K, but only(n - 1)(n - 2) restrictions on
the uneompensated matrix V.
Now consider the aggregation of in consumers, each choosingindependently
with his own preferences and budget (but all facing the sameprices). Denoting
9aggregates by bars and values for the individuals by superscript .s(s= I,....in),
we have5
=K5 +b(x5)T.
Choose a set of linearly independent vectors Ak, each orthogonalto all the
vectors x5. In general the vectors x will be linearly independent, and thuswe can
certainly find n -- m vectors A' but not, in general,more than that. Assembling the




By the same reasoning as used in theindividual case, the matrix ATVA
is symmetric negative semi-definite, butof order n - in. Thus aggregate demand
exhibits "less" concavity than individualdemand, the divergence increasingas the
number of individuals increases. The numberof implied symmetry restrictions is
- m)(n - in - 1), a number which declines as in increases. Ifin no matrix
A can be found (unless there islinear dependence among thevectors .v3) and
aggregate demand does not necessarily exhibitany concavity or symmetry pro-
perties at all, the SonnenscheinMantel_Debreuresult. On the other hand ifn is
large and m small (2 formany households), the properties of V donot diverge
greatly from those for the individual. Thuswe can state the following:
Result I
Even if the individuals in the householdreceive their own budgets and make
totally independent choices, the behaviorof the household will be "close",in a
clearly defined sense, to that ofan individual consumer, provided the numberof goods
is large relative to the number ofmembers of the household.
This is a statement that couldnot have been made onany firm basis even two or three years ago.
The Characteristics Model
In the characteristics model,the individual has preferencesover characteristics which are taken to have thesame properties as the traditionalpreferences over
Note that Vis the exactaggregate analog ofV,but is not the aggregate analogof the Slutsky matrix. Thelatter would requireadifferent decomposuion of J fromthat gis'en in the text, namely
V=S +F4)T
where 11(x)/(y) and,!x1. and S is then thetrue analog of the Slutsky matrixfor the individual. Since the terms (1)Tandb(xiTare quite different, so are SandK'. Note also that we will have a different S brevery different rule for distributingthe aggregate income.
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goods. The characteristics are obtained, in the case we shall use in this paper, from
goods in such a way that the vector of characteristics is a linear transformation
of the vector of goods of the form= Hi, whereis the characteristics vector.
If B is a square nonsingular matrix, there is a unique inverse transformation
x = B'z from characteristics into goods. Inthis case we can aggregate the
behavior of the members of the households over characteristics to obtain an
aggregate characteristics vector 2. Since there will be a unique vector q = pB
of implicit characteristics prices, and since we have assumed behavior over
characteristics to fit the traditional pattern of behavior over goods, the matrix
C of uncompensated partials of characteristics with respect to their implicit
prices will have the same properties as ascribed to V in the traditional case. The
matrix of price partials of goods in this case is equal to BCBwhich has the
same symmetry and negative semi-definite properties as C and thus as thetradi-
tional V. The characteristics model gives identical results with respect to the
demand properties of goods as the traditional model so tong as the matrix B is
square and nonsingular, requiring that the number of goods andthe number of
characteristics be equal.
But if the number of goods exceeds the number of characteristics, the matrix
B is of order r x n (where r is the number of distinct characteristics). From standard
optimizing theory, the individual will attain his optimum subject to a linear
budget constraint on goods by consuming only r goods. The choice of those r
goods will depend on the consumer's optimal characteristics vector and thus will,
in general, vary from consumer to consumer. The choice of those r goods will
then give a basis in B from which the inverse relationships will be determined. In
particular, if B3 is the r x r basis chosen from B by the sth consumer, we will have
= (B3) and q5 =p(B5)'.The latter relationship implies that the implicit
prices on characteristics differ between consumers, ruling out all standard aggregat-
ing procedures for characteristics over individuals.
Solution of the individual's optimization problem over characteristics gives,
of course, a unique solution in terms of goodstypically with the quantities of
n - r of the goods being zero. We cannot use the Slutsky analysis on thedemand
for goods because the solution is a corner solution, but the demand for goods
satisfies the axioms of revealed preference.Aggregation over consumers whose
individual behavior satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference has been shown,
in McFadden Mantel Mas-Collel and Richter (1974) to lead to results similar to
the Sonnenschein-Maritel-Debreu conclusions. Although we do not have an
analysis of the case in which m < n which shows a continuous relationship between
the size of the group and the degree of divergence from the individual pattern, as
we do when we can use the Slutsky equations, it can beconjectured that some
relationship of this kind does exist.
The most important, arid most observable, effects of the characteristics
model on household behavior lie in efficiency considerations. An individual con-
sumer will not need to consume more goods than there are characteristics but,if
r < rt, different individuals may, in general, choose differentcollections of r
goods. Thus a heusehoki, each of whose members is efficient in consuming only r
'Sce Lancaster (1971), p 5S-9.
IIgoods, may consume more than r goods in the aggregate and thus willappear to
he consuming inefficiently. Indeed, the aggregate characteristicsvector may be
such that it could be more efficiently attained by consuminga set OlgoOdS (hiferent
from those chosen by any member of the htiieho!d. Figureshows an example
with 6 goods and 2 characteristics where the householdconsumes 4 goods
(G1, G2 by one member, G5. G6 by the other) when, if the householdhad really












I_f the indiriduals in the luusehold receile their own budgets and make totally
independent choices, and ii there are more goods than distinct characteristics, the
behavior of the household nwv he apparently inefficient, in the sense that ispurchases
more goods than there are characteristics.The potential divergence between the
number of goods purchased by the household and the number that would hepurchased
by an individual will he less, the smaller the household and the smallerthe number of
goods relative to characteristics.
Conclusions on 1-louseholds as Simple Aggregates
If a household is a simple aggregate of individuals each of whom makeshis
own choices subject to his own preferences andhis own budget (and in the absence
ofjoint and externality effects), then the household cannot, in general, beconsidered
to behave as if it was a single individual. Itsobservable behavior will differ from
that of the single individual in that demand may show a lesser degreeof symmetry
and concavity and consumption may appear to be inefficient asevidenced by the
purchase of more goods than there are distinct characteristics. In boththese
respects, however, the household's behavior will be "close" tothat of an individual
if the size of the household is small and the number of characteristics andgoods is
large. Simple examples in two goods and two individuals vastly overstatethe
degree of divergence between household and individualbehavior, as compared
with the more realistic case of few individuals and many goods.
III. HOUSEHOLD DEcIsIoN FUNCTIONS
We now turn from the model of the household as a mere collection olin-
dependent individuals to consider models in which decisions are made by the
household as a unit, but in which the individuals in the household still possess
their own preferences.
If there is to be a single household decision function which reflects and is
based upon the preferences of the individual members of' the households, then the
Arrow impossibility theorem applies just as it does to larger groups. There can be
no rule that will generate, froni the preference orderings of themembers alone, a
household preference ordering that is Paretian, has unrestricted domain, satisfies
the condition of independence from irrelevant alternatives, and is non-dictatorial.
unless the preferences of the individuals are related in some particular way, To
have a household behaving as a single decision-making unit, one or more of the
Arrow conditions must be dropped, we must work with a household preference
ordering over a restricted domain, we must assume that the preferences of house-
hold members are always related in such a way as to always lead to unambiguous
household preferences, or we must be willing to have the household decision func-
tion based on more information than is contained in individual preference orderings
alone.
The traditional approach of simply regarding the household as a single person
can be considered to have rested upon one of two implicitassumptions, that the
household decision function is dictatorial and reflects the preferences of its
130
"head", or that the members of the household haveidentical preferences and
unanimity is found on all choices.
Our purpose is, of course, togo beyond this kind of simplification. For the
household, we can hi-eak out of the Arrowprison by using the "close-knitness"
property that is not applicable in the case of the broader socialwelfare function.
This property makes it reasonable thatthe household can make decisionson the
basis of more information about the effecton its members than is contained in
preference orderings alone. In particular,we can contemplate a household decision
function which takes account of degrees ofpreferences and of relative weights to be
given to the preferences of different members.
Swnuglson Households
The household decision functiondiscussed at some length by Samuelson
(1956) has the form U{u'(x1), u2(x2),um(xm)] where u1(x) is the utility function
of the i-th household memberderived from his own consumptionvector x1. There
are no externalities, interdependenciesor joint effects. U is an increasing function
of the u1's (so the household isParetian) and the concavity propertiesof U on the ui's and ofthe u1'son the x's are such as to make Ua strictly quasi-concave function
of the ultimate argumentsu. A sufficient, but not necessary, conditionfor this is that the u"s are strictlyconcave and U is a strictly quasi-concavefunction of the u's. Concavity, not merelyquasi-concavity, is appropriate for the ui'ssince the household function is assigningcardinal measures to the utilitiesofall its members.
With a household utility functionof this form, the householdoptimum for given household incomeY can be achieved by dividingincome among members
of the household in sucha way as to equalize weighted marginalutilities of income. That is, we must have:
U=
(S)'
for all i,j. The individualmembers then optimizeon their personal budgets.
Since LI is strictlyquasi-concave on the individualgoods quantities u, and since all householdmembers face thesame prices, the goodsaggregates X = satisfy the properties ofHicksian compositegoods and thus U is strictlyquasi- concave over the household goodsvector X. The cencavityproperties of household demand are identicalto those of an individualconsumer There is, however,one respect in which the behaviorof the householdmay differ from that of theindividual. This will bewhen there aremore goods than characteristics
Characteristics andParetjan Households
Consider the Samuelsonhousehold in thecontext of the characteristics model, in whichwe shall assume theconsumption technology is suchas to have more goods than thereare distinct characteristicsThe overall structureof the optimizing process is thesame as in the traditionalmodel, each member ofthe household maximizing hisown utility function subjectto his own budgetcon- straint (on goods), thebudgets being allocatedin accord with theSamuelson rule.
14The kinds of choices that the individuals will make will be the same as in the
aggregate model and the reasoning given in Part II which led to Result 2 will he
applicable here. In particular, if members of the household differ sufficiently in
their individual preferences, different members may obtain their optimal collections
of the same set of characteristics by consuming different bundles of goods. Thus
even with a unified household decision rule like that of theSamuelson model, we
can still have a situation like that depicted in Figure 1, with apparent inefficiency
and with the household purchasing more goods than there are characteristics.
The above argument is not applicable only to households of the Samuelson
type, but applies for any kind of household decision function which isParetian
(that is, in which U is an increasing function of the u"s). The optimum for any such
household must be such that the utility level attained by any member of the house-
hold has been attained with the least possible expenditure on goods from the house-
hold budget. For members with sufficiently different preferences, this minimum
expenditure criterion will imply different goods in the optimum bundles of
different members, giving us once again the situation leading to Result 2 and
depicted in Figure 1.
We can summarize our findings in this Part as follows:
Result 3
In the Samuelson model, aggregate household demand will exhihU the same
concavity properties as for the individual, whatever the relationship between the
number of goods and the number of characteristics.
Result 4
If there are more goods than distinct characteristics, neither the Sanuelson
household nor any other household with a Parelian decision function need necessarily
be observed to behave as f it were a single individual, since the household may
purchase more goods than there are distinct characteristics, contravening the
efficiency cond ilion for the individual.
We should note that Result 4 may be applicable even in a dictatorial house-
hold. The dictator can get the other members of the household to any utility level
he has chosen for them most cheaply by giving each the appropriate optimal goods
bundle, leaving the maximum residue for his own use. This will lead to the same
kind of results as in the Paretian household.
Conclusions on Households with Centralized Decisions
In the absence of externalities, interdependencies, or joint consumption
effects, even a centralized household decision function is not sufficient to guarantee
that the household behaves like a single individual in all respects. In particular,
although the household may possess the demand substitutability properties of the
individual, it may not possess the efficiency properties.
'In the characteristics analysis, u is taken to be strictly quasi-concave on characteristics but when
mapped into a function of goods it becomes quasi-concave only, due to the prevalence of zero goods
quantities. Thus we must drop the "strictly" from te specification of all the concavity properties of the
demand for goods, for the individual as well as the househOld.
15I
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IV. JOINT CONSUMPTION ANI)RELAED MATTERS
Since a household consists ofa small numberof individuals with close associa-
tions, we can expect every kind of jointand externality effect, including inter-
dependence of utilities, to playa far more significant role than in the case ofa large
aggregate. A considerable share of typical householdactivities (meals, recreation,
simple occupancy of the home, forexample) involve joint consumptionIn sonic
sense or major consumption externalities. Thetaxonomy, alone, of all the possible
effects would bea considerable task, while a full exploration of territorywhich has hut a few signposts atpresent would be well beyond thescope of a single paper.
We shall not take up at all thequestion of interdependent preferences,8but confine our investigation toexternal interdependence, through jointconsumption or otherwise, in which the utilities of otherhousehold members donot appear as direct arguments in the utilityfunction of any one. The onlydirect interrelation
between utilities is confinedto the formulation of the householddecision function,
Joint Consumption andExternalities
There is an externalityeffect within the householdwhenever the utility (preferences) of one memberare affected by the quantitiesconsumed of any good by any other member.We shall concentrateon the fullest kind of positiveex- ternality,joint consumption, inwhich the consumptionof any quantity of thejoint good (or characteristic) byany member of the household hasthe same effecton other members of thehousehold as if they had directlyconsumed it themselves. (Ifsorneone turns on the radio,everyone hears it). Thus the totalquantity consumed within the householdappears in everyone's utility function,making the goodor characteristic a kind ofhousehold public goodor public characteristic. It willbe convenient to refer to thesecharacteristics or goodsas "public" within thecontext of the household, althoughthey are private goodsfrom the point of viewof society as a whole and are purchasedby the household throughthe market. The property of beingprivate or publiccan be taken to reside in theindividual characteristic (a foodmay have a private flavor buta public odor). A true house- hold public good isthen one withcharacteristics whichare all public, a private good with characteristiwhich are all private,and a mixed good withcharac- teristics of both kinds,
If all goods availableto the householdare either public or private inthe above sense, the analysis is preciselythe same as if thehousehold was amini-economy facing a lineartransformationcurve (the budget line) andthe ordinary theoryof public goods can beapplied. Although thehousehold is small, its sizeis essentially fixed and phenomenasuch as "crowding"9are not important. Providedthe household has aproper decision function,an optimal solutioncan be reached by central purchase andallocation, by lump-sumcontributions towardspurchase of the public goodsfrom members'budgets or even (ina highly Sophisticated household!) by a Lindahisolution with the publicgood sold to differentmembers at different prices.
8One coukj developthe relevant analysisalong the linessuggested in Winter (1969) 9Sce Buchanan(1965) or Eltjckson (1973).
16In the traditional case. where there is a one to one relationship between
a characteristic and a good, the structural properties of household demand are not
changed by the existence ofjoint consumption within the household, provided the
household has a mechanism for attaining an optimum.'1 In particular, if the
household decision function has the Samuelson form U[u'(x', V).....m(m, I/I]
with U a strictly quasi-concave function of all the ultimate arguments x, V ( V is
the vector of public goods), then U is a strictly quasi-concave function of the
aggregate household goods quantities X, l', for the same reasons as in the all-
private case. Thus the concavity propertiesofhousehold demand are not affected
by the introduction of the public goods.
More Goods than Characteristics
If there are more goods than characteristics, the extent to which the household
behavior conforms to the efficiency conditions for the individual depends on the
separate relationships between the number of public goods and public characteris-
tics and between the number of private goods and characteristics, in the assumed
absence of mixed goods. It is obvious that, since each member's utility from the
public characteristics depends on the household totals, those totals should be
obtained in the least cost way in order to achieve optimality. Thus the number of
public goods will not exceed the numberofpublic characteristics, whatever the size
ofthe household. On the other hand, the relationship between the number of
private goods purchased by the household and the number of private charac-
teristics may exceed the number that would be purchased by the single individual,
for the same reasons as in Parts II and Ill.
Mixed Goods
In the overall economy, many of what are regarded as pure public goods
undoubtedly have private aspects (defense is not a pure public good to someone
living next to an airbase), but these private aspects are scattered and of variable
impact in most cases. Thus it is a reasonable first approximation to consider a
division of goods into public goods and private goods over the economy as a
whole, and only when we consider smaller segments of the economy (especially
localities) do we need to consider goods as having a mix of public and private
characteristics.
For a unit as small as the household, however, many or most goods that have
public characteristics (in the special household sense) will also have private
characteristics. The dwelling itself will have a mixture of public characteristics (the
areas of joint use) and private (in individual bedrooms). Thus we can regard the
mixed good as typical within the household, not an unusual special case.
Since our concern in this paper is with the extent to which the household can
be treated as if it were a single individual, we shall not give any descriptive analysis
of the mixed goods case but proceed immediately to c-nsider the effect of mixed
goods on the concavity and efficiency properties of household demand.
'° Some interesting possibilities arise in the absence of household cooperation, including game-
type behavior based on mutual "free ride" considerations. -
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It is obvious that concavityproperties. whichare not affected by the presence
of pure public goods, wilt nUt be affected by the presence of mixed goods. Any
effectswiflbe confined to tnc efficiency criteria. Since pure public goods give elil-
ciency properties identical with those for the individual, whilepure private goods
lead to a divergence between the properties of the household and the individual.
we can expect that mixed goods tend to tower the divergence as compared with
pure private goods. Confirmation of our expectations commences with the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem
If there are two characteristics, one public (within the household)and one private,
a household decision function, and an array of n mixed goods, the householdwill
purchase only two of the goods, however largemay be the number of goods and the
size of the household.
Denote by zthe amount of the private characteristic receivedby the s-th
member of the household, and byz2the total household quantity of the public
characteristic. Leta, a,be the quantities of the two characteristicscontained
in unit quantity of the f-tb good,and letxdenote the quantity of the j-th good
consumed by the s-th individual. The householdoptimum is then the solution of
the problem
subject to
aIjw + a2jw2 s=1.....in;j=l.....n
such that x0 unless thecorresponding constraint is satisfiedas an equation. In generai, the optimumwill involve theconsumption of exactly two goodsby any individual, and these willbe goods whichare adjacent along the efficiency
These constraints correspondto taking the derivatives of theLagrangeanwith respect to the xs.The value assigned tov canbe taken to be essentially arbitrary,butvmust be positive.
max U[ii'(z,z2), u2(z,z2),..




where goods units have beenchosen so that pricescan be taken as unity, andIis the household income. Inaddition we have themnnonnegativity restrictions x all s,j.
The dual problem involves them+ 2 dual variables s= 1,.. . ,in(the shadow price of the privatecharacteristic to each individual),w2(the common shadow price of the publiccharacteristic), and v(the shadowmarginal valuation of household income). There isa dual constraint for eachx of the form"frontier (see Figure 1). Suppose the optimum for the first individual is consumption
of goods j, J + I(the goods are taken to he numbered successively along the
frontier), then the following must be true:
a11w +(I2jt'2= V
-F- a2j.w2= u
± 2&2'.- kj,j ± I.
The two equations determine w and w2, the inequalities must hold if],
j + 1 are truly the optimal pair of goods. Now consider any other consumer for
whom the shadow price on the private characteristic is ',t'. The value ofw2must
be the same as for the first consumer, and the inequalities to he satisfied have the
same coefficients a1, a21 as for the first consumer. Now if we had w > w, the
left hand sides of the relationships corresponding to the two equations above
would be greater than v, contravening the dual constraint. Ifwe had w < w,
then none of the inequalities would be satisfied as an equation and the s'th indi-
vidual would receive no goods. Thus we must havew = w.so that the same
inequalities are satisfied as equations for the s-th individual as for the first, and his
consumption will consist of the same two goods as for the first individual, proving
the theorem. The difference between this result and that for the non-jointcase,
in which every individual may consume a different pair of goods (if thereare a
sufficient number of goods relative to the number of characteristics) arises from the
common shadow pricew2which would be replaced by individual shadow pricesw
in the absence of joint consumption.
Note that the proof of the theoremis based on efficiency conditions alone
and is independent of the specific properties of U, u5, so it holds forany degree of
dispersion among the private preferences of household members, provided they
can agree on a household decision function which leads to an proper optimum.
If we extend the theorem to cover a 3ituation in which therearer1private
characteristics andr-public characteristics, we can expect any oneconsumer to
consume not more thanr1±r2different goods. The appropriate dual relations
will give usr1 + r2equations inr1private shadow prices andr2common shadow
prices. Now suppose that there are two consumers whose optimal choice of goods
differs in r' goods. The total number of dual equations to be satisfied is thusr1 +
r2+ r', while the number of dual variables is2r1+ r2. Thus the optimal choices
for the two individuals cannot differ in more goods than thereare private charac-
teristics.
Consider any individual consumingr1 ± r2goods and thus whose shadow
prices satisfyr1 + r2dual equations. The public characteristic shadow pricesare
common and thus exogenous to the individual. Thus the individual's equation
system in his private shadow prices consists ofr1 + r2equations inr1unknowns,
so thatr2of the equations are linearly dependenton the remainder, This means
that any other individual who consumes at leastr1of the same goods, and thus
whose private shadow prices satisfyr1of the equations, will have the remaining
equations also satisfied and thus will consume allr1 + r2of the same goods as the
first individual.
19But we have shown that the two goods collections cannot differ by more than
r1 goods, and thus have a minimum of r2 goods in common. lfr2r1, therefore,
the individuals will consume identical sets of goods (in types of goods, not neces-
sarily in their proportionsj.
We can bring together the basic theorem and its extension into a result that
also serves to summarize the effect of joint consumption on observed household
behavior:
Result 5
Joint consumption effects do not change the concavity properties of household
demand, as compared with the situation in their absence, hut hareimportant reper-
cussions on the extent to which the household satisfies the efficiencycriteria of the
single individual. In particular,fgoods possess some characteristics that arecon-
sumed jointly (public characteristics) and otherswhich efject only the individual
directly consuming the good (private characteristics), theeffect of the joint consump-
tion is to reduce the divergence between the number ofgoods that the household
would be observed to purchase and the number that wouldhe purchased hi' an efficient
single individual. If the number of public characteristicsis at least as great as the
number of private characteristics, i/ic householdwill purchase (lie same number of
goods as would a single individual.
V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
We can summarize the overall resultsof the paper as follows:
(1) There is no generalwarrant for considering the householdto behave as
if it were a single individual.The observable behavior of the householdmay differ
from the typical behavior of theindividual in two lespects
the concavity properties of its demandfunction may differ from that of the
individual
the efficiency properties (observedas numbers of goods purchased
relative to the number of distinctcharacteristics) may not conformto those of the individual.
(2) If the household isan aggregate of independentconsumers, the concavity
properties of its demand functionwill be weaker than those forthe individual, but will come closer to theindividual properties as the sizeof the household decreases. The efficiencyproperties will diverge from thoseof the individual, with the maximum extent ofthis divergence decliningas the size of the household decreases.
(3) The existence ofa well-behaved household decisionfunction of a Samuel- son or similar kind willremove all the divergence in concavityproperties between the household and theindividual, but willnot remove the divergence in efficiency properties.
(4) The existence of jointconsumption effects within the bouseholdwill not affect the concavityproperties of demand but willreduce the divergence in effici- ency properties between thehousehold and the individual.
20The household that will behave as jilt were a single individual is either dictator-
iaor has a well-behaved decision function and joint effects in consumption
covering at least half the characteristics relevant tots members.
Co!ii,nbia LI nit'ersiit'
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